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Abstract – We analyze the compliance costs of individual taxpayers resulting from the German 
income tax. Using survey data that has been raised between December 2008 and April 2009, we 
find evidence for a considerably higher cost burden of self-employed taxpayers. Taxable income 
and the demand for external support are positively correlated with compliance costs, while the 
time effort of female taxpayers is significantly lower. We also find evidence for a positive corre-
lation of education and tax knowledge with the compliance burden. By contrast, a joint assess-
ment of a married couple seems to reduce the monetized time effort. The aggregated cost bur-
den of German income taxpayers amounts to 6.1-7.2 billion €, respectively 3.2-3.7 % of the in-
come tax revenue in 2007. This estimate is higher than latest projections in a number of other 
European countries like Spain and Sweden, but significantly lower than results for the United 
States and Australia. 
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1.  Introduction 
The economic costs of taxation do not only consist of the tax payment itself and the correspond-
ing excess burden, but also of the time effort and the monetary expenses spent on tax com-
pliance and tax planning activities. As these operations are at least partially caused by the high 
degree of tax complexity (for an etiology of tax complexity see Slemrod 2005), they are to be 
interpreted as an additional “tax effort” reducing the economic resources of individuals without 
increasing the fiscal budget of the government. From this perspective, compliance costs have a 
negative impact on the efficiency of a tax system (Alm 1996) and increase the marginal costs of 
funds (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 1996). In addition, tax compliance costs and tax complexity may 
influence the compliance with tax regulations including tax evasion and tax avoidance activities 
(Alm 1988, Alm 1999, Erard and Ho 2003). Therefore, the investigation of this hidden burden of 
a tax system is an important question of research. 
While there has been a comprehensive literature on the compliance costs of individuals in Can-
ada, the United States and Australia (Slemrod and Sorum 1984, Pitt and Slemrod 1989, Vaillan-
court 1989, Pope and Fayle 1990, Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992, Pope 1995, Tran Nam et al. 
2000, Guyton et al. 2003, Vaillancourt and Clemens 2008), there exists evidence only for a li-
mited number of European countries (Sandford et al. 1989 for the UK, Malmer 1995 for Sweden, 
Diaz and Delgado 1995 and Delgado et al. 2001 for Spain, Klun 2004 for Slovenia and Blažić 
2004 for Croatia). A review on the corresponding literature is given by Evans (2003). 
Regarding the case of Germany as the largest EU economy, there have been two contributions 
on the compliance costs of individuals that are exclusively available in German language (Tie-
bel 1986 and RWI 2003). In addition, these studies do not allow for an aggregate estimate on the 
compliance burden of the German income tax. The investigation of Tiebel (1986) is clearly out-
dated and only poorly documented. The survey data of RWI (2003) has not been used for the 
projection of an aggregate cost-estimate and is publicly not available. Furthermore, the results 
of this study should be biased due to an oversampling of self-employed taxpayers and respon-
dents with a high market income. Hence, the cost-efficiency of the German income tax system is 
still an open question. 
There are specific properties of the German income tax that should be interesting from an inter-
national perspective. In contrast to self-reporting systems like in the U.S., German taxes on in-
come are calculated by the fiscal authorities. Hence, the taxpayer is committed to declare the 
taxable income but not to calculate the tax payment. This may reduce the compliance costs of 
private households by cost of the administration. Furthermore, German wage earners are typi-
cally not obliged to file an income tax statement if their income does not include to a significant 
extent other sources than wage earnings. This results from the relatively detailed German pay-
as-you-earn system (PAYE) and implies a reduction of compliance costs of private households 
by cost of the employers.  2 
In addition to cost measurement, the identification of the key cost drivers is an important ques-
tion of research. If the compliance burden is correlated to sources of income, we may expect that 
tax complexity does not only affect a household’s economic resources but also economic deci-
sion-making. For example, Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) observe considerably higher com-
pliance costs for self-employed taxpayers that may negatively affect self-employment and im-
pair economic growth (Djankov et al. 2002 and Grilo and Irigoyen 2006). Furthermore, the iden-
tification of the key cost drivers may help to simplify the tax system. 
In contrast to the substantial number of surveys, the literature lacks in contributions analyzing 
the cost burden of private households by multivariate methods. Apart from Slemrod and Sorum 
(1984), Slemrod (1989), Vaillancourt (1989) and Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992), previous inves-
tigations are typically confined to descriptive analyses. Up to our knowledge, there is no study 
for a European country investigating the compliance cost burden of individuals by regression 
analysis. Therefore, results on the key cost drivers of individuals are broadly restricted to Can-
ada and the United States.  
In our contribution, we analyze the time effort and the monetary expenses of German self-
employed persons and wage earners resulting from income tax regulations. Our investigation is 
based on a recent and representative survey raised between December 2008 and April 2009 
within a project that was funded by the German Ministry of Finance. The data includes cost es-
timates as well as socio-economic information on private taxpayers and allows us to estimate 
for the first time the aggregate income tax compliance burden of German households on an em-
pirical basis. Furthermore, we utilize for the first time multivariate methods to investigate the 
key cost drivers of the compliance burden of individuals in a European country. 
We find that the compliance costs of German households amount to 6.1-7.2 billion € or 3.2-3.7 % 
of the personal income tax revenue in the tax year 2007 (including solidarity tax surcharge).1 
This is higher than latest empirical results for Sweden and Spain, but considerably lower than 
cost estimates for Australia and the United States. Combining our result with previous research, 
we find that compliance cost estimates of U.S. households are significantly higher compared to 
corresponding studies for European countries. Taking into account the diversity of methodolo-
gies, it does not seem probable that this outcome should be driven by differences in the me-
thods of research. 
Regarding the key cost drivers, we find a positive effect of taxable income and the use of exter-
nal support, while there is no significant impact of age and the number of children. Corres-
ponding  to  previous  investigations,  we  state  a  considerably  higher  cost  burden  of  self-
employed taxpayers. There is also evidence for a positive correlation of compliance costs and 
education as well as tax knowledge, while we find a significantly lower time effort for females. 
Furthermore, our primary estimate implies that a joint assessment of a married couple reduces 
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compliance time per household by about 28 % to 33 %. This can be taken as evidence that a re-
duction of tax statements  (for example by filing an  income tax report each second year for 
wage-income earners or other groups of taxpayers with a relatively constant taxable income) 
could be an appropriate strategy to reduce the burden of red tape. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we exemplify our data base including the sam-
pling and the methodology of cost measurement. In section 3 we describe the multivariate anal-
ysis identifying the determinants of the compliance cost burden. The aggregate burden of the 
German income tax is projected in section 4 including a comparison to international estimates. 
Section 5 concludes. Further notes on methodological issues as well as additional regression 
results are included within the appendix. 
 
2.  Data set 
2.1.  Sampling and cost measurement 
The data has been raised between December 2008 and April 2009 within a project funded by the 
German Ministry of Finance. The sample consists of 1,009 working individuals. To ensure that 
the sample matches the German population in terms of gender, age, education and monthly net 
income, respondents were selected based on a quota plan. Therefore, an exact response rate is 
not available. The corresponding frequency in the population was taken from the 2008 statistical 
yearbook for Germany (German Federal Statistical Office 2009), which covers 37 million people 
making up Germany’s working population. With an error level of 5 %, no significant difference 
between the population and the sample could be identified in terms of gender, age, education 
and monthly net income. 
Tax compliance cost estimates may be biased by misunderstandings, errors and mistakes of the 
survey participants. According to the literature (Sandford 1995, Blažić 2004), personal inter-
views are regarded as more reliable than mail or e-mail surveys. Furthermore, survey response 
is typically higher. Therefore, we opted for face-to-face interviews to ensure a high response 
rate as well as more accurate information. All interviewers were informed on the term “tax 
compliance costs” and other aspects of the questionnaire by a training seminar.  
Within the literature on compliance cost measurement, there has been criticism on a potential 
overestimation of cost burdens resulting from survey methods (Sandford 1995). For example 
Tait (1988) argues that respondents could overstate their cost estimate to impose pressure on 
political authorities. For that reason, we decided to quantify the time effort of individuals on a 
careful basis. 4 
According to the results of Klein-Blenkers (1980), there is a positive relationship between the 
number of compliance cost categories in a questionnaire and the resulting cost estimate.2 There-
fore, the questionnaire was restricted on two items for time effort that are considered to be most 
important and that are similar to RWI (2003) (time burden for the income tax return and for col-
lecting receipts). In addition, we asked for the monetary expenses allocated to tax compliance 
(tax advisory services, software, tax literature etc.) as well as for the person who prepared the 
income tax return (taxpayer, spouse, tax preparer, other person). As cost estimates on third par-
ties did not seem to be reliable, we did not account for questions on the time burden of unpaid 
helpers to prepare the income tax report. 
Furthermore, the questionnaire included socio-economic information (age, marital status, sex, 
education level, number of children), the occupation of the taxpayer and the taxpayer´s spouse 
(self-employed, employed, public official, other), the level of tax knowledge and the geographic 
area (Eastern Germany and Western Germany). We regarded information on income to be a 
sensitive  issue  that  could  negatively  affect  survey  response.  Furthermore,  not  all  German 
households are aware of their yearly taxable income. Therefore, we asked not for the house-
hold´s taxable income, but for monthly net income classes regarding the taxpayer and the tax-
payer´s spouse. Using additional information on the employment status of the taxpayer, we 
were able to construct a proxy variable for taxable income. The corresponding methodology is 
described by appendix 7.1. An extract of the survey questionnaire is provided in appendix 7.2. 
An important issue regarding the measurement of compliance costs is the valuation of the time 
effort. There is no universally accepted method regarding this aspect and that is one reason why 
international comparisons of compliance burdens are delicate. Pope (1995) describes six possi-
ble procedures of time valuation: (1) each individual´s own valuation of time (subjective esti-
mate), (2) the individual´s valuation of time subject to a maximum value, (3) the overall pay-
ment to get rid of all compliance costs (subjective estimate), (4) the gross wage per hour, (5) the 
net wage per hour and (6) the median of subjective cost estimates. As has been reported by 
Blažić (2004), there are even more methods that have been adopted in the compliance cost litera-
ture (for example average GDP per capita by Allers 1994). 
According to Wallschutzky (1995), taxpayer´s own valuations of the time burden may not be 
consistent over a number of repeated interviews. This could result in an overestimation of com-
pliance costs. For that reason, we decided not to estimate the value of the time effort by subjec-
tive statements of a taxpayer. We also excluded economic average values that do not account 
for differences in the opportunity costs of individuals (for example GDP per capita). Assuming 
a  neoclassic  choice  between  labor  and  leisure,  a  rational  taxpayer  would  assess  a  marginal 
working hour with its marginal value of consumption, respectively the net wage. However, this 
                                                           
2   Within his survey of German businesses, Klein-Blenkers (1980) asked for the time allocated 
to a number of compliance activities as well as for an aggregated time burden. On average, 
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value does not hold from a social perspective if the alternative to compliance work is another 
income-generating activity (for example self-employment).3 
As our primary and lower bound estimate, we assess the time burden by the net wage per hour. 
This rather conservative approach of cost measurement has already been adopted by Blumen-
thal and Slemrod (1992) and Blažić (2004). In addition, we derive an upper-bound estimate 
based on the gross wage that has been used by Vaillancourt and Clemens (2008). The pre-tax 
and the post-tax incomes per working hour for different income classes have been calculated on 
the basis of the German socio-economic panel (for a thorough description of the GSOEP see 
Wagner et al. 2007). We use the wage based on the actual working hours instead of the contrac-
tual working hours. 
Expenses for tax advice, information material and software are partially deductible from the 
German tax base. A deduction is limited to business- and income-related items (e.g. for book-
keeping). The resulting effect depends on the marginal tax rate that varies from 14.8 % to 47.5 % 
(including solidarity tax surcharge). As our paper focuses on compliance costs from a social 
perspective,4 we do not account for the tax-deductibility of monetary expenses. We also do not 
consider cash flow benefits resulting from the delay between the generation of profits and the 
payment of tax installments (for a detailed description on these effects see Blažić 2004). Due to 
the low interest rates and the relatively short periods for prepayments of German self-employed 
persons, these effects should have been rather low for German taxpayers. 
2.2.  Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
As has been reported, not all employees of the German working population are obliged to file a 
tax return by reason of the PAYE system. As all necessary compliance activities of non-filers are 
conducted by the employer, this group of taxpayers does not bear a significant compliance bur-
den. Regarding our survey, 265 participants (26.2 %) did not file an income tax return. This pro-
portion is nearly identical to the rate of non-filers in the scientific use file of the German income 
tax statistics 2004 (for a thorough review of this data see German Federal Statistical Office 2008) 
and demonstrates a significant cost reduction of German households resulting from the PAYE 
system as well as the accuracy of our sample. Concentrating on households with a positive 
compliance burden, we excluded this group from our final sample. 
In 212 cases the tax statements have been prepared by the spouse, by a relative or by a friend of 
a survey participant. Due to the fact that these respondents should not be able to appropriately 
estimate the costs of preparing the household´s tax return, we decided to exclude these cases 
from our final sample as well. Furthermore, we eliminated subjects who state that they do not 
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4   Corresponding to the terminology of Tran-Nam et al. (2000), we focus on social compliance 
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bear monetary expenses because they have access to costless tax return preparation (23 cases). 
As we do not account for the time burden of external helpers, an inclusion of these cases would 
bias our estimate. 
Finally, we excluded all cases with missing information on aspects of the cost burden or incon-
sistent cost estimates (52 cases). Our final sample includes 457 subjects with information on 
compliance time and monetary expenses, 47 % of them using a professional tax advisor to pre-
pare the income tax return. The descriptive statistics on socio-economic factors of this sample 
are displayed in Table 1.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Most of the respondents in our final sample are males (about 60 %), employees (74 %) and do 
not have children entitled to child benefits (61 %).5 About half of the respondents are married 
and more than 86 % claim to have at least limited tax knowledge. Most respondents are middle-
aged (about 81 % have an age between 26 and 55 years), while the education level is relatively 
high  (with  about  26 %  having  a  university  degree).  Regarding  taxable  income,  most  of  our 
households (79 %) do not earn more than 60,000 €. 
In table 2, we present mean values of the compliance cost burden for various subsamples of our 
final data set using the net income for time valuation purposes. Alternative estimates if we 
adopt gross income for time valuation are included in table 3. On average, a survey respondent 
spends 10.6 hours on collecting receipts and preparing the income tax return. In previous Ger-
man studies, Tiebel (1986) reports on average 11.2 hours of a German household (including the 
compliance costs of the German wealth tax), while RWI (2003) estimates the time effort with 
15.8 hours. Taking into account that RWI (2003) oversamples the number of self-employed as 
well as the number of taxpayers with a high market income, our estimate does not seem to be 
unrealistic. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Almost two thirds of the time burden results from the collection of receipts. Therefore, the do-
cumentation  requirements  in  calculating  taxable  income  are  the  most  time-consuming  com-
pliance activity. This corresponds to previous research on the compliance costs of income taxa-
tion in Germany (RWI 2003) and other countries (Vaillancourt 1989, Blumenthal and Slemrod 
1992, Delgado et al. 2001). In addition to the time effort, an average respondent in our data has 
monetary expenses amounting to 212 €. 
Including a monetized time burden of 131 € with average costs per hour of 12.32 €, this leads to 
total compliance costs of 342 €. Using the gross income per hour of 19.06 € for time measure-
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education) the age limit is increased to 21 or 25 years. 7 
ment purposes, the monetized time burden would increase to 202 € and the total compliance 
costs to 414 €. The average time burden per hour varies from 6.39 € for taxpayers with a taxable 
income up to 20,000 € and 17.58 € for respondents with a taxable income above 80,000 € (respec-
tively 10.04 € to 26.74 € using gross income for time valuation). 
Comparing the compliance burden to the household´s taxable income, each respondent on av-
erage has to bear compliance costs of 1.1 % of his taxable income. Valuing time effort with gross 
income, this relative burden would increase to 1.3 %. These estimates are lower than relative 
cost burdens of RWI (2003) ranging from 0.8 % to 3.7 % for different income groups, but corres-
pond to international estimates. For example Slemrod and Sorum (1984) report average costs of 
1.4 % of taxable income, while the estimate of Tran-Nam et al. (2000) lies in a range from 0.6 % 
to 1.5 %. 
According to our data, average monetary expenses are making up 62 % of the total costs (51 % if 
we choose gross income for time valuation). The high relevance of monetary expenses results 
from the fact that 47 % of all tax statements in our final sample are prepared by a tax adviser. 
However, in our original data the fraction of prepared tax reports is only 38 %. This is due to 
our sampling procedure excluding cases if a tax statement has been filed by a third person. Ac-
counting for that bias by a weighting scheme, we obtain alternative estimates for the monetary 
expenses to overall costs of 59 % respectively 49 %. 
These estimates correspond to Sandford et al. (1989), but contrast other studies like Allers (1994) 
and RWI (2003) who report a monetized time effort of about 2/3 of the overall cost burden. This 
could be explained by the following aspects. (1) As has been elucidated above, RWI (2003) over-
samples taxpayers with high compliance costs. (2) Compared to RWI (2003), our study derives a 
rather conservative estimate on the monetized time effort increasing the fraction of monetary 
expenses. (3) According to the literature (McKinstry and Baldry 1997), there is a growing inter-
est in tax advice. Therefore, it should be expected that the proportion of monetary expenses is 
increasing over time. 
[Table 3 about here] 
As has been reported by previous research (Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992, Tran-Nam et al. 
2000), the burden is unequally distributed among taxpayers. From tables 2 and 3 it becomes ob-
vious that compliance costs are especially correlated to the use of professional tax advice, taxa-
ble income and self-employment. The average cost of a self-preparer is 119 € (175 € if we would 
choose the gross income for time valuation). That is only about 20 % (25 %) of the costs of indi-
viduals who use a professional tax preparer. Corresponding to previous studies (Slemrod and 
Sorum 1984, Tran-Nam et al. 2000, Guyton et al. 2003, RWI 2003), employees and other taxpay-
ers bear only 24 % (25 % if we choose the gross income for time valuation) of the average cost of 
a self-employed subject. 8 
Similar to Blažić (2004), compliance costs are positively correlated with taxable income. Indi-
viduals in the lowest income group (taxable income < 20,000 €) devote 182 € on income tax 
compliance, whereas individuals in the highest income tax group spend 592 €. Using gross in-
come for time valuation yields to alternative values of 204 € and 691 €. The especially high cost 
burden of taxpayers with taxable income ranging from 60,001 € to 80,000 € results from a corre-
lation of taxable income and self-employment. 
The descriptive analysis also indicates that gender, marital status and tax knowledge may affect 
compliance costs. Men spend on average 1.3 % (1.5 % if we choose the gross income for time 
valuation) of their taxable income on tax compliance, while the effort of a woman amounts to 
about 0.8 % (respectively 1.0 %) of taxable income. Unmarried persons expend 1.4 % (1.6 % if 
we choose the gross income for time valuation) of their taxable income, but married persons 
only 0.8 % (respectively 0.9 %). Finally, subjects who declare that they have at least moderate 
knowledge of tax law bear higher costs (1.1 % respectively 1.3 % of taxable income) than those 
who assessed themselves to have no tax knowledge (0.9 % respectively 1.1 % of taxable income). 
Regarding age, education, and the number of children, the descriptive analysis reveals no clear 
effect. However, these descriptive results should be interpreted with caution. To separate the 
joint effects of the collected independent variables, we conduct a multivariate analysis that is 
presented in the following section. 
 
3.  Multivariate analysis 
3.1.  Estimation approach 
According to the literature (Vaillancourt 1989, Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992), we analyze the 
compliance burden of German households by an OLS model. We account for heteroskedasticity 
by the use of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Due to economies of scale within the 
compliance process (especially in case of the self-employed taxpayers in our data), we choose a 
logarithmic specification. Hence, we examine the correlation of the logarithm of compliance 
costs compared to the exogenous factors. As the coefficients of a linear logarithmic model can 
be interpreted as elasticities, this approach allows us to analyze relative changes of the cost 
burden. For example a regression coefficient of -0.3 implies that an increase in the exogenous 
variable of 1 % reduces compliance costs by 0.3 %. Furthermore, this specification ensures nor-
mality of the distribution of the model´s residuals. The equation can be described by: 
0 1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8 9
CCOST TAXABLEINCOME AGE SELF EMPLOYMENT
JOINT ASSESSMENT UNIVERSITYDEGREE
WOMAN CHILDREN TAXKNOWLEGDE ADVICE
=α +α ⋅ +α ⋅ +α ⋅ −
+α ⋅ +α ⋅
+α ⋅ +α ⋅ +α ⋅ +α ⋅ +ε
  (1) 
The error is described by  ε , while  0 α  to  9 α  denote the correlation coefficients. The variables 
are defined as follows: 9 
CCOST   Compliance costs are calculated as the logarithm of the sum of mone-
tary expenses and the monetized time burden. In alternative specifica-
tions, we analyze also the logarithm of the cost components (time bur-
den and money burden). 
TAXABLE INCOME   Logarithm of taxable income: we estimate taxable income by a proce-
dure described in appendix 7.1. 
AGE  Logarithm of the age of our survey respondents 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT   Dummy variable for self-employed taxpayers 
JOINT ASSESSMENT  Married couples in Germany are entitled to a joint tax return. Due to 
economies of scale, this could result in a decrease of the cost burden 
compared to individual tax statements. To control for the effect of joint 
returns on the compliance burden, we include a dummy variable for 
married couples who are dual-income earners. 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE Dummy variable for taxpayers with a university degree 
WOMAN  Dummy variable for female taxpayers 
CHILDREN  The German tax law includes child benefits depending on the number 
of  children.  Therefore,  we  include  the  logarithm  of  the  number  of 
children entitled to child benefits increased by 1.6 
TAX KNOWLEDGE  Dummy variable for taxpayers who claim to have at least moderate tax 
knowledge 
ADVICE  The variable accounts for the use of external advisers. We use two al-
ternative  specifications.  In  models  analyzing  the  overall  compliance 
costs, we include the proportion of monetary expenses to the overall 
cost burden. Hence, we measure the extent of outsourcing compliance 
activities (for a similar approach see Eichfelder and Schorn 2009). In 
models analyzing monetary expenses or the monetized time burden, 
we use a dummy variable for tax returns that are prepared by a tax ad-
viser.7 
Due to the fact that the use of external advisers and the experiences with tax legislation may be 
affected by tax complexity, the variables TAX KNOWLEGDE and ADVICE can be partially in-
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no children. 
7  The proportion of monetary expenses to overall compliance costs would be endogenous in 
the corresponding models. 10 
terpreted as endogenous. For that reason, we do not consider these variables in each specifica-
tion of our model. 
Our OLS regression could be biased by the fact that we exclude a considerable number of ob-
servations from our final sample. Therefore, we estimated a two-stage Heckman sample selec-
tion procedure (Heckman 1979) for control purposes. Within the probit selection equation, we 
accounted for all cases excluded from our final sample. Apart from ADVICE, we included the 
identical independent variables as in our original specification. As can be demonstrated by the 
insignificant results on the inverse Mills ratios in table 9 (see appendix 7.3.), we do not find any 
evidence for a sample selection bias. The same holds for additional specifications of our model 
in appendix 7.4. 
3.2.  Results 
Table 4 documents the regression results of our primary specification for overall compliance 
costs, monetary expenses and the monetized time burden using the net income for time valua-
tion purposes. Corresponding test statistics are reported in appendix 7.3. 
[Table 4 about here]   
Corresponding to Vaillancourt (1989) and Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992), we find a positive 
correlation between compliance costs and taxable income. This should result from three differ-
ent aspects. (1) The complexity of a tax return as well as the amount of bookkeeping obligations 
increase in taxable income. (2) The interest in tax planning is positively correlated with taxable 
income8 and (3) the value of time allocated to tax compliance increases in taxable income. As a 
result from (3), the impact of taxable income on the monetized time burden (models 3, 4) is 
clearly stronger than the effect on monetary expenses (models 5, 6). The correlation coefficients 
for TAXABLE INCOME in table 3 are clearly smaller than one. That implies a regressive rela-
tionship between compliance costs and income. Hence, the relative cost burden per taxable in-
come should be higher for taxpayers with a low taxable income. 
As has been documented by the literature (Vaillancourt 1989, Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992 
and Guyton et al. 2003), we find a strong and positive effect of self-employment on the com-
pliance burden. That can be explained by the fact that bookkeeping and compliance obligations 
are more complex for self-employed taxpayers. Furthermore, the German PAYE system implies 
a cost reduction for wage earners. While German employers are obliged to comply with the in-
formation requirements of wage taxes and social insurance contributions, their employees may 
use the information of payroll accounting to file their income tax report. 
As self-employed persons are more interested in external support (Slemrod 1989) and should be 
more experienced with tax regulations, it seems to be appropriate to concentrate on the models 
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tax rate and the demand for tax advice. 11 
excluding ADVICE and TAX KNOWLEGDE to derive a quantitative estimate. According to our 
models 1, 3, and 5, self-employment increases the cost burden by 155 %, the time burden by 
69 % and monetary expenses by 198 %. Corresponding to other dummy variables in logarithmic 
OLS models, these absolute effects of self-employment are higher than the regression coeffi-
cients in table 4 that are measuring marginal effects (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980). 
We find further a negative correlation for JOINT ASSESSMENT and compliance costs. That out-
come holds especially for the time burden and is to some extent supported by (weak) empirical 
evidence on the effect of marital status (Slemrod and Sorum 1984 and Vaillancourt 1989). The 
effect should mainly result from economies of scale. While each taxpayer of a single household 
is obliged to file an income tax return, there is only one tax statement for joint filers. According 
to our estimate, including the information of two persons into one tax return reduces the time 
burden by 28 % to 33 %. This outcome implies that a reduction of tax returns (for example by 
demanding a tax return for each second year) could yield a significant reduction of compliance 
costs. 
We also find a positive correlation between UNIVERSITY DEGREE and the monetized time 
effort. By contrast, there is a negative, but not significant correlation coefficient for a university 
degree and the amount of monetary expenses. There are the following explanations for this re-
gression result. (1) The personal circumstances of taxpayers with a university degree are more 
complex by exogenous reasons (for example due to expenses for business trips, business lunch, 
etc.). (2) Taxpayers with a university degree are more interested in compliance work and tax 
planning. (3) Due to their higher qualification, taxpayers with a university degree care about 
their tax affairs on their own resulting in a higher time burden, but not necessarily a higher cost 
burden. Our result is to a limited extent supported by Slemrod and Sorum (1984) and Vaillan-
court (1989) who find weak evidence for a positive correlation of education and compliance 
costs. 
Similar to Vaillancourt (1989) we also find that the time burden of female taxpayers is signifi-
cantly lower. Assuming that male taxpayers are more risk-seeking and interested in aggressive 
tax planning strategies (Croson and Gneezy 2009), our result is not surprising. From this pers-
pective, while male taxpayers concentrate on a reduction of their tax payment (implying higher 
compliance costs), women seem to be more interested in a reduction of their time effort (imply-
ing lower compliance costs). 
Furthermore,  we  can  state  a  positive  effect of  TAX KNOWLEGDE  that  holds especially for 
monetary expenses. By reason of the potential endogeneity of this variable, the interpretation is 
not straightforward. On the one hand, taxpayers with at least limited tax knowledge may be 
aware of possible deductions and tax-related problems. Therefore, these taxpayers should be 
more willing to spend monetary resources on external support. On the other hand, taxpayers 
that receive external advice enhance their knowledge on taxation. Therefore, tax knowledge 
could also be a result of allocating monetary expenses to an external adviser. 12 
There is also a significant correlation between compliance costs and the use of external advisers 
(ADVICE). The positive effect on monetary expenses and the negative effect on the time burden 
suggest that outsourcing compliance activities reduces the time burden of the taxpayer and 
causes additional expenses. This corresponds to the hypothesis that time effort may be substi-
tuted by external support. The overall impact of external advice (defined as the proportion of 
monetary expenses to the overall cost burden) on compliance costs is positive and highly signif-
icant. 
This outcome can be justified by rational decision-making of a private taxpayer. Assuming a 
higher degree of tax knowledge of external advisers, we would expect that the propensity to use 
paid preparation increases in the complexity of a tax return. Therefore, we may interpret a high 
proportion of expenses for external support as proxy for a complex tax statement. Correspon-
dingly, we would not obtain a significant effect for the proportion of monetary expenses to 
overall compliance costs (as proxy for the degree of using tax preparers) if we restrict our analy-
sis to households with paid preparation.9 
Finally, we do not find significant results for AGE or for the number of children entitled to child 
benefits. Hence, there is no empirical evidence that child benefits of the German income tax sys-
tem increase the compliance burden of German households to a significant extent. This should 
be due to the fact that child benefits typically do not result in noteworthy filing effort for Ger-
man households. The number of qualified children is documented on the wage tax card and 
administrated by the fiscal authorities in cooperation with the employer. Administrative obliga-
tions of a household arise especially for children of full age due to the exemption limits of a 
child´s income. However, this effect should not be perceptible in our data. 
In appendix 7.4., we tested a number of robustness checks controlling for linearity, sampling 
weights correcting for a representative distribution and the valuation of the time burden by 
gross income instead of net income. These additional calculations support basically the outcome 
of our primary specification with the following exceptions. Regarding an alternative specifica-
tion of our parameters to control for linearity, the effect of JOINT ASSESSMENT is only signifi-
cant on a 10 % level (table 10). Controlling for weighting parameters, we obtain exclusively one 
specification with a significant outcome for JOINT ASSESSMENT and UNIVERSITY DEGREE 
(table 14). In addition, we do not find any significant result for TAX KNOWLEDGE if we use 
sampling weights. By contrast, the choice of gross income for time valuation does not affect the 
significance of our exogenous variables to a considerable extent (table 17). Concluding, the ef-
fects of JOINT ASSESSMENT, UNIVERSITY DEGREE and TAX KNOWLEDGE should be in-
terpreted more cautiously if we consider our additional regression results in appendix 7.4. 
                                                           
9   Therefore, our result does not contrast the findings of Eichfelder and Schorn (2009) who find 
a negative correlation between compliance costs and the degree of outsourcing compliance 
activities to tax preparers for a sample of German businesses. 13 
4.  Aggregate burden of the German income tax 
In this section, we use the information of our data to project the aggregate private cost burden 
of the German income tax. Comparing this cost burden to tax revenue, we are able to derive an 
estimate for the cost-efficiency of the German income tax system. We extrapolate the aggregate 
cost burden on the basis of costs per taxable income. Taking into account that self-employment 
has been identified as an important cost driver (Slemrod and Sorum 1984, Tran-Nam et al. 2000, 
Guyton et al. 2003), we differentiate between the compliance costs of self-employed persons and 
other  taxpayers  (almost  exclusively  employees  and  public  officials)  regarding  four  different 
classes of taxable income (0 to 22,000 €; 22,001 to 42,000 €; 42,001 to 62,000 €; above 62,000 €). In 
order to prevent cost projections driven by outliers, our income classes have been selected to 
include a minimum of 25 survey respondents per table cell. 
It has already been mentioned that we excluded households if the tax statement has been pre-
pared by a spouse or another household member. This results in an oversampling of tax returns 
prepared by external advisers that could bias our extrapolation. Therefore, we estimate weight-
ing parameters controlling for the original distribution of paid preparation compared to self-
preparation. Weighted relative cost burdens based on a monetized time effort using net income 
and gross income per hour are documented by table 5.10 
[Table 5 about here] 
We find higher relative cost burdens for self-employed persons and households with a low tax-
able income. That corresponds to economies of scale that have been documented in the litera-
ture (Sandford et al. 1989, Tran-Nam et al. 2000, Blažić 2004). The economies of scale regarding 
other taxpayers do not seem to be as strong as for self-employed taxpayers. This outcome cor-
responds to international contributions as well (Sandford et al. 1989, Pope and Fayle 1990). 
We use the scientific use file of income tax statistics of the German Federal Statistical Office to 
extrapolate the aggregate cost burden (for a thorough review of this data see German Federal 
Statistical Office 2008). The latest micro file available is from 2004. As our data has been col-
lected in 2008 and 2009, we correct the taxable income in our statistical data by the index of 
gross wages in Germany from 2004 to 2008. Hence, we increase the taxable income in the data 
of the German Federal Statistical Office by about 7.4 %.11 
                                                           
10   In each income class, we calculated the ratio of the average costs per average taxable income 
instead of the average of the costs per taxable income ratios. This is to prevent a strong influ-
ence of households with a very high ratio of costs per taxable income. 
11   See  for  the  index  of  German  gross  wages  http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/ 
cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Statistiken/VerdiensteArbeitskosten/ArbeitsLohnneb
enkosten/Arbeitskosten/Tabellen/Content75/IndexJaehrlich,templateId=renderPrint.psml 
(request from the 2d of April 2011). 14 
Costs are calculated by the proportion of compliance costs to taxable income as documented in 
table 5. Regarding cases with a negative or zero taxable income, we assume a cost burden of 
432 € for self-employed persons and of 101 € for other taxpayers. These are the average com-
pliance costs for households in the lowest income class (0 € to 22,000 €). In case of time valua-
tion using gross income, the corresponding cost burdens are 493 € and 118 €. 
We estimate the compliance costs of German households resulting from income taxation with 
6.1-7.2 billion €. That is about 3.2-3.7 % of the German income tax revenue in the tax year of 
2007 (including solidarity tax surcharge). Weighting our data by the distribution of households 
in the German income tax statistics 2004, we obtain an average time effort of 7.7 hours for each 
household filing an income tax return. Accounting for the fact that 26.1 % of the households in 
the German income tax statistics 2004 do not file an income tax return, the average time effort is 
reduced to 5.7 hours per household. The following table compares our outcome to international 
evidence. 
[Table 6 about here] 
We find that the compliance costs of German households are medium-sized in relation to other 
estimates. While households in latest studies in Spain (Delgado et al. 2001) as well as in Slove-
nia, Croatia and Sweden seem to have a lower burden of red tape resulting from the income tax, 
cost estimates for the U.S. and Australia are generally higher. Furthermore, the average time 
burden of U.S. households is significantly higher than all European estimates that are presented 
in table 6. Taking into account the diversity of survey designs between the various European 
and U.S.-studies, it does not seem to be probable that this outcome is mainly driven by metho-
dological issues. Hence, the results of table 6 can be taken as evidence for considerably higher 
income tax compliance costs of U.S. households compared to households in European countries. 
A possible explanation for this outcome could be the self-assessment system of the U.S. Federal 
income tax. U.S. citizens are obliged to calculate their tax payments themselves. By contrast, 
German households are exclusively obligated to file their income tax statement, while the tax 
payment is calculated by the German fiscal administration. Furthermore, a fraction of about 
26.1 % of the German taxpaying population does not file an income tax return by reason of the 
German PAYE system. German wage earners may also use the information of payroll account-
ing as basis for filing their income tax return. This implies an additional cost reduction of Ger-
man households by the cost of German employers. 
Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that international comparisons on the basis of ex-
isting studies should be biased by differences of tax systems and methodological issues. There 
are at least five different aspects of a potential bias.  
(1)  We find considerable differences in terms of the sampling methodology. For example, 
Klun (2004) and Blažić (2004) do not include small businesses and self-employed tax-
payers within their data set that are part of our survey and bear significantly higher 15 
compliance costs. Therefore, the estimates for Slovenia and Croatia should be biased 
downwards if there are compared to our aggregate cost burden. 
(2)  There are significant differences in the methods of data collection (personal interviews, 
mail surveys, telephone surveys) and in the design of survey questionnaires. As has 
been argued in section 2, the size of the cost estimate should depend on the requested 
number of compliance activities as well as on the definition and description of the term 
“tax compliance costs”. 
(3)  The valuation of the time effort is not standardized. For example, Pope and Fayle (1990) 
use a considerably higher cost value per hour than Tran-Nam et al. (2000) who also ana-
lyze the compliance burden of Australian wage earners and self-employed persons. 
(4)  The cost burden per tax revenue is significantly affected by the tax rate. Hence, a low 
tax rate implies a comparatively high proportion of compliance costs in relation to tax 
revenue. From a comparative perspective, the average time effort per taxpayer is there-
fore an important information. 
(5)  There exist additional compliance costs, costs of the tax administration and tax reve-
nues that are not included within the cost estimates in table 6. Regarding Allers (1994), 
the cost fraction depends on the fact whether the burden of private households is com-
pared to all income tax payments (including payments deducted at source) or exclu-
sively to tax revenues resulting from income tax statements. Furthermore, the Dutch 
PAYE system implies compliance effort for employers not taken into account within the 
estimate of table 6. 
The fifth aspect holds likewise for our study. However, as the calculation of wage taxes and so-
cial insurance contributions is a uniform process, it seems to be delicate to differentiate between 
compliance costs of German wage taxes and the administrative burden of social insurance con-
tributions (Sandford et al. 1989 and Vaillancourt 1989). Using cost estimates of data raised by 
order of the German Ministry of Economics and Labor in 2003, we can derive a minimum cost 
value of about 14 billion € for the sum of German wage taxes and social insurance contributions 
(Kayser et al. 2004).12 This amounts to about 2.7 % of the revenue collected (including solidarity 
tax surcharge and social insurance contributions).13 
                                                           
12   This value is a lower bound for the corresponding cost burden. Kayser et al. (2004) calculate 
only an explicit burden for the compliance costs of social security contributions. Taking into 
account the relatively high value of this estimate, it seems to be likely that this burden in-
cludes compliance costs of wage taxes as well. We use the price index of the German Federal 
Statistical Office for tax advice to correct the data of Kayser et al. (2004) to the year of 2007. 
13   The solidarity tax surcharge revenue has been proportionately allocated to wage taxes, other 
personal income taxes and corporate income taxes (German Federal Statistical Office 2009). 16 
Assuming an identical cost-efficiency of wage taxes and social insurance contributions, we can 
derive a cost burden of 3.8 billion € of German employers resulting from wage taxation. Accord-
ing to calculations of the fiscal administration in the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen (RWI 
2003), the administrative costs of the German personal income tax are estimated with 1.9 % of 
tax revenue (3.5 billion €). Including all cost elements (compliance costs of households and em-
ployers as well as administrative costs), we obtain minimum operating costs of the German per-
sonal income tax (including corresponding solidarity tax surcharge payments) ranging from 
13.4-14.5 billion € or 6.9-7.5 % of the tax revenue in 2007. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Within our paper, we analyzed the compliance burden of German households resulting from 
the income tax. We found strong evidence that self-employment increases the burden of red 
tape to a considerable extent. While the average costs of self-employed taxpayers amount to 
786 € (932 € if we choose gross income for time valuation), other taxpayers (almost exclusively 
employees and public officials) bear on average 189 € (respectively 235 €). Our primary estimate 
implies that self-employment increases the cost burden by about 155 %. 
Taking into account that the tax obligations of German small businesses and self-employed per-
sons do not only include compliance activities for income tax purposes, but also duties resulting 
from the value added tax, local business taxes and (in case of an employer) wage taxes and so-
cial insurance contributions, the burden of red tape may not only affect the economic resources 
of  private  households  but  also  interfere  their  economic  decision-making.  Corresponding  to 
Djonkov et al. (2002), market entry costs can negatively affect economic efficiency. Furthermore, 
Grilo  and  Irigoyen  (2006) find  evidence  that  self-employment  is  negatively  affected  by  per-
ceived administrative complexity. 
We also find that income and the demand for external advice are positively correlated with 
compliance burdens. Furthermore, the time burden of taxpayers with a university degree is sig-
nificantly higher, while the effort of female taxpayers is considerably lower. This outcome could 
be partially driven by the fact that some groups of taxpayers are more interested in tax plan-
ning. If well-educated or male taxpayers have lower marginal planning costs or higher prefe-
rences for aggressive planning strategies, this should result in higher cost burdens. This argu-
ment is supported by the positive correlation of tax knowledge and compliance costs in our da-
ta set. However, Murphy (2004) finds by contrast that education is negatively correlated with 
aggressive planning strategies of Australian taxpayers. Furthermore, the effect of education is 
not significant in all our models. Hence, additional research should be necessary to analyze the 
question, if and why education significantly affects the burden of red tape. 17 
There is evidence that a joint assessment of dual-income earners results in a significant reduc-
tion of compliance time. This outcome can be explained by economies of scale that have been 
also documented in relation to other aspects of the compliance process (Sandford et al. 1989, 
Allers 1994). From this perspective, a reduction of tax returns should result in a cost reduction 
even if it does not affect the information required by the fiscal authorities. This can be taken as 
an argument that reducing the number of tax statements could be a promising strategy to de-
crease administrative cost burdens. For example, wage earners and other taxpayers with a tax 
deduction at source shall only have to file a tax return each second year according to a recent 
German draft legislation. Taking into account that most German wage earners file a tax return 
despite of the PAYE system, it could be even more promising to increase incentives of wage 
earners for non-filing a tax return (for example by a “non-filing tax credit”). 
The aggregate burden of private households resulting from German income taxation lies in a 
range of 3.2-3.7 % of the income tax revenue (including solidarity tax surcharge). This propor-
tion is higher than latest cost estimates in other European countries like Sweden and Spain, but 
considerably lower than corresponding results for Australia and the U.S. The very high cost 
estimates and time burdens of the U.S. households in relation to Germany and other European 
countries could partially be driven by the U.S. self-assessment system as well as by the German 
PAYE system implying a cost reduction for wage earners. Furthermore, the U.S. income tax sys-
tem includes a number of complex aspects and regulations that are not part of the German tax 
system  (alternative  minimum  tax,  state  income  taxes  in  addition  to  the  federal  income  tax, 
earned-income tax credit and other issues). 
It should be taken into account that international comparisons on compliance cost burdens are 
typically biased by methodological issues including the sampling of taxpayers and the valua-
tion of the time burden. From this perspective, comparative studies will be necessary to get a 
deeper understanding of the main causes of tax complexity as well as the main possibilities for 
tax simplification. A corresponding approach seems to be promising to answer the question of 
Slemrod (1996), which is the simplest tax system of them all. 18 
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7.  Appendices 
7.1.  Calculation of taxable income 
As has been elucidated above, most German households are probably not aware of their yearly 
taxable income. Therefore, we asked our respondents for the monthly net income regarding the 
taxpayer and the taxpayer´s spouse. In addition, questions on income are often associated with 
high non-response. Therefore, we did not ask for the exact amount of net income, but for the 
following net income classes: 
•  Less than 1,000 € 
•  1,000 € to 2,000 € 
•  2,000 € to 3,000 € 
•  More than 3,000 € 
In order to measure a household’s taxable income, we collected additional data concerning age, 
marital status, obligation of the respondent and the respondent´s spouse to pay social insurance 
contributions and the number of children eligible for child benefits. 
Based on this data we calculated for each subject the taxable income that corresponds with the 
lower and the upper bound of the subject’s net income category. To obtain a metric variable, the 
average of the lower and the upper taxable income of the category is selected as a proxy for the 
subject’s taxable income. Subjects that selected the highest category were assigned a value equal 
to 1.5 times the lower bound (4,500 €). 
In order to derive the taxable income from the net income we assumed that taxpayers use stan-
dard deductions instead of itemizing deductions. In particular, we consider the following stan-
dard deductions: standard deduction for insurance contributions, standard deduction for spe-
cial private expenses and standard deduction for work-related expenses (exclusively for non-
self-employed taxpayers). Furthermore, we assume a joint assessment of married couples. Con-
cerning the amount of health insurance contributions we based our calculations on average con-
tribution rates. 
Finally, for calculating the taxable income we had to solve the following equations: 
a.  Taxable income = Pre-Tax Income – Standard Deduction for Insurance Contributions – 
Standard  Deduction  for  Special  Private  Expenses  -  Standard  Deduction  for  Work-
Related Expenses. 
b.  Pre-Tax-Income – Social Security Contributions – Income Taxes = Post-Tax Income 22 
Taking into account the tax scale as well as the calculation instructions for the German social 
insurance contributions, we expanded the 2008 wage tax program procedure plan of the Ger-
man Federal Ministry of Finance to solve these equations iteratively. 
7.2.  Survey questionnaire (extract) 
 
1.  Who prepared your last tax return? 
 
￿  On my own 
￿  Someone else in the household 
￿  A Tax Advisor 
￿  Did not file a tax return (Attention: please go on with question 4) 
￿  Other 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.  How much money did you spend on your last income tax return, e.g. for tax advisory 
services, tax advisory books or software, or the like? 
 
  _________________   € 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.  How much time (in hours) did you spend on both the preparation of your last income tax 
return and the collection of the needed receipts? 
 
  _________________   hours for the preparation of the tax return 
 
  _________________   hours for the collection of the receipts 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.  How do you assess your own knowledge regarding tax law? 
 
￿  No knowledge 
￿  Some basic knowledge 
￿  Good or very good knowledge 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.  Age: 
 





6.  Gender: 
 
￿  Male 23 
￿  Female 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.  Your highest education: 
 
￿  University degree 
￿  University-entrance qualification 
￿  Secondary school leaving certificate 
￿  Lower secondary school leaving certificate 
￿  No graduation 
￿  Other 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
8.  What is your occupation? 
 
￿  Public Official 
￿  Employee 
￿  Self-employed 
￿  No occupation 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
9.  Do you have children? 
 
￿  yes 
￿  no    (Attention: please go on with question 11) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
10.  For how many children do you receive child benefits? 
 
  _________________   children 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
11.  Please sum up how much of your own monthly income is left after deduction of income 
taxes and social insurance contributions. Which class do you belong to? 
 
￿  <    1.000 € 
￿        1.000 – 2.000 € 
￿        2.001 – 3.000 € 
￿  >    3.000 € 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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12.  Your marital status? 
 
￿  Married 
￿  Unmarried 
￿  Divorced/Widowed 
￿  Other 
 
If married please go on with question 13, otherwise: 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
13.  What is your spouse’s occupation? 
 
￿  Public Official 
￿  Employee 
￿  Self-employed 
￿  No occupation 
 
 
If no occupation:  Thank you very much for your participation! 
Otherwise:  Please go on with question 14 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
14.  Now, our last question: Please sum up how much of your spouse’s monthly income is left 
after deduction of income taxes and social insurance contributions. Which class does your 
spouse belong to? 
 
￿  <    1.000 € 
￿        1.000 – 2.000 € 
￿        2.001 – 3.000 € 












7.3.  Test statistics 
In this appendix, we present test statistics for the regression results presented in 3.2. We tested 
for linearity by the inclusion of an additional variable for taxable income (the squared value of 
TAXABLE INCOME). In this specification, the regression analysis is severely affected by multi-
collinearity resulting in variance inflation factors that are higher than 400. Furthermore, we ob-
tained similar regression results for an alternative model structure testing for linearity (see ap-
pendix 7.4.1.). Therefore, non-linear correlations should not bias our regression results. 
Testing for heteroskedasticity, we found significant correlations of the squared residuals and a 
number  of  independent  variables  (especially  for  TAXABLE  INCOME  and  SELF 
EMPLOYMENT). For that reason, we use standard errors within our regression that are robust 
for heteroskedasticity. 
Table 7 documents the variance inflation factors of our primary specification in table 4. As all 
factors are clearly smaller than 2, there is no sign that multicollinearity could be an estimation 
problem.  
[Table 7 about here] 
Within table 8, we document the results of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test regarding the normality 
within the distribution of the model´s residuals. We do not find significant evidence for a non-
normal distribution. 
[Table 8 about here] 
Table 9 includes our estimates for the inverse Mills ratios of the Heckman sample selection 
model. We do not obtain any statistically significant result. 
[Table 9 about here] 
7.4.  Robustness checks 
7.4.1.  Linearity 
Our regression results could be biased by the fact that the correlation of the logarithm of com-
pliance costs to exogenous parameters is non-linear. For that reason, we include in this appen-
dix additional calculations that are exclusively based on dummy variables. This results in the 
following alternative specifications: 
TAXABLE INCOME   Instead  of  the  logarithm  of  taxable  income,  we  include  dummy  va-
riables for income brackets from up to 20.000 € to more than 80,000 €. 26 
AGE  Instead  of  the  logarithm  of  taxpayer’s  age,  we  include  dummy  va-
riables for different age groups from up to 25 years to more than 55 
years. 
CHILDREN  We account for child benefits by a dummy variable with a value of one 
for households with at least one child being entitled for a child benefit. 
ADVICE  In models analyzing the overall cost burden, we include dummy va-
riables  representing  the  proportion  of  monetary  expenses  to  overall 
compliance costs. The lowest proportion is zero (self-prepared tax re-
turn  without  any  monetary  expenses)  and  the  highest  proportion  is 
more than 80 percent. As this variable would be obviously endogenous 
for models analyzing the monetary burden or the time burden, we in-
clude in these models a dummy variable for tax returns that are pre-
pared by a tax adviser. 
Table 10 documents the regression results of our alternative specifications. The outcome corres-
ponds to our primary regression model. However, JOINT ASSESSMENT is only significant on a 
10 % level. 
[Table 10 about here] 
Table 11 documents the variance inflation factors of this alternative specification. As a result of 
the higher number of variables, inflation factors are higher than in our primary specification. 
That holds especially for the variables accounting for tax preparer usage. Nevertheless, all va-
riance  inflation  factors  are  clearly  smaller  than  4.  Therefore,  multicollinearity  cannot  be  re-
garded as a serious problem. 
[Table 11 about here] 
Within table 12, we document the results of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test regarding the normali-
ty within the distribution of the model´s residuals. We do not find significant evidence for a 
non-normal distribution. 
[Table 12 about here] 
Table 13 includes our estimates for the inverse Mills ratios of the Heckman sample selection 
model. We do not obtain any statistically significant result. 
[Table 13 about here] 27 
7.4.2.  Weighting factors 
In our primary regression model we do not account for the distribution of the different groups 
of taxpayers in the German population. In addition we do not consider the overweighting of tax 
declarations filed by a tax preparer in our final sample. Therefore, we calculated additional re-
gression results using identical weighting factors as for the projection of the compliance cost 
burden in section 4. Table 14 documents these alternative regression results that are similar to 
the outcome of our primary specification. However, JOINT ASSESSMENT and UNIVERSITY 
DEGREE are only significant in one model and we do not obtain a significant result for TAX 
KNOWLEDGE. 
[Table 14 about here] 
Table 15 documents the variance inflation factors corresponding to the regression results in ta-
ble 14. We do not find any evidence for multicollinearity. 
[Table 15 about here] 
Within table 16, we document the results of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test regarding the normali-
ty within the distribution of the model´s residuals. We do not find significant evidence for a 
non-normal distribution. 
[Table 16 about here] 
Our weighting factors are based on the distribution of taxpayers in our final sample in relation 
to the corresponding distribution in the German income tax statistics 2004. As the weighting 
factors do not account for the distribution in our overall data set, a test for sample selection 
based on a Heckman model does not seem to be appropriate. 
7.4.3.  Valuation of the time burden 
In our primary estimate we use the net income per hour to monetize the time burden. In the 
following specification, we test for the gross income per hour as alternative estimate for the 
monetized time burden. Table 17 documents the regression results of our alternative specifica-
tion. The outcome corresponds to our primary model. 
[Table 17 about here] 
Table 18 documents the variance inflation factors corresponding to the results in table 18. We do 
not find any evidence for multicollinearity. 
[Table 18 about here] 
Within table 19, we document the results of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test regarding the normali-
ty within the distribution of the model´s residuals. Apart from model 2 (overall compliance 28 
costs including all control variables), we find no evidence for a non-normal distribution. Taking 
into account the high number of observations, the limited number of variables and the low sig-
nificance level of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, model 2 can be interpreted as at least asymptot-
ically normally distributed. 
[Table 19 about here] 
Table 20 includes our estimates for the inverse Mills ratios of the Heckman sample selection 
model. We do not obtain any statistically significant result. 
[Table 20 about here] 29 
Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on socio-economic information 
Attribute  Value  N  % 
ADVICE 
Self-preparation  244  53.4 
Paid preparation  213  46.6 
GENDER 
Female  185  40.5 
Male  272  59.5 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
No  340  74.4 
Yes  117  25.6 
MARITAL STATUS 








None  63  13.8 
At least moderate knowledge  394  86.2 
TAXABLE INCOME 
€ 0 – 20,000  69  15.1 
€ 20,001 – 40,000  199  43.5 
€ 40,001 – 60,000  94  20.6 
€ 60,001 – 80,000  66  14.4 
> € 80,000  29  6.3 
AGE 
≤ 25 years  16  3.5 
26 – 35 years  95  20.8 
36 – 45 years  140  30.6 
46 – 55 years  136  29.8 
> 55 years  70  15.3 
CHILDREN  
0  280  61.3 
1  102  22.3 
2 and more  75  16.4 
EDUCATION 
University degree  117  25.6 
University-entrance qualification  69  15.1 
Secondary school leaving certificate  160  35.0 
Lower secondary school leaving certifi-
cate / No graduation 
111  24.3 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on compliance costs (net income) 30 























  Mean 
TOTAL    6.55  4.06       10.60      130.54  211.65  342.19  1.1 
ADVICE 
No  3.77  4.95  8.72      101.49   17.10  118.59  0.4 
Yes  9.72  3.04       12.75      163.82  434.52  598.34  1.9 
GENDER 
Female  4.92  3.52  8.44  97.09  191.37  288.47  0.8 
Male  7.65  4.42  12.07  153.29  225.44  378.74  1.3 
SELF-
EMPLOYMENT 
No  3.83  3.36  7.19  81.94  107.50  189.44  0.6 
Yes       14.44  6.06       20.50      271.78  514.31  786.09  2.4 
MARITAL 
STATUS 
Other  6.30  4.16       10.46      134.21  185.22  319.43  1.4 
Married  6.90  3.99       10.89      128.08  243.62  371.71  0.8 
TAX 
KNOWLEDGE 
None  5.25  2.63  7.88  81.53  129.29  210.81  0.9 
At least moderate  6.75  4.28       11.04      138.38  224.82  363.20  1.1 
TAXABLE  
INCOME 
€ 0 – 20,000  3.80  2.23  6.02  38.48  143.14  181.62  2.4 
€ 20,001 – 40,000  6.83  4.39  11.22  113.02  169.65  282.68  1.0 
€ 40,001 – 60,000  4.63  2.77  7.40  89.12  142.79  231.91  0.5 
€ 60,001 – 80,000  11.22  6.80  18.01  312.71  424.20  736.91  1.1 
> € 80,000  6.75  4.03  10.78  189.47  402.34  591.81  0.5 
AGE 
≤ 25 years  3.17  1.34  4.52  36.36   82.50  118.86  1.4 
26 – 35 years  7.78  3.12       10.90      121.90  155.42  277.32  1.0 
36 – 45 years  4.21  4.08  8.29      102.26  181.77  284.03  1.0 
46 – 55 years  7.17  5.29       12.46      161.17  298.40  459.57  1.2 
> 55 years  9.09  3.50       12.59      160.86  208.71  369.58  1.2 
EDUCATION 
University degree  8.38  5.25       13.63      217.58  332.00  549.58  1.1 
University-entrance 
qualification 
4.08  5.59  9.68  96.46  158.60  255.06  0.9 
Secondary school   5.69  2.86  8.56  93.92  198.69  292.61  1.3 
Lower secondary 
school  
7.37  3.55       10.93      112.78  136.46  249.24  0.9 
CHILDREN  
0  5.73  3.93  9.66  107.85  147.42  255.28  1.1 
1  4.32  4.37  8.69  131.77  222.00  353.77  0.9 
2 and more  12.29  4.13  16.42  206.88  424.56  631.44  1.2 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on compliance costs (gross income) 31 























  Mean 
TOTAL    6.55  4.06       10.60  202.05  211.65  413.70  1.3 
ADVICE 
No  3.77  4.95  8.72  157.92   17.10  175.02  0.5 
Yes  9.72  3.04       12.75  252.60  434.52  687.11  2.2 
GENDER 
Female  4.92  3.52  8.44  150.89  191.37  342.27  1.0 
Male  7.65  4.42  12.07  236.84  225.44  462.28  1.5 
SELF-
EMPLOYMENT 
No  3.83  3.36  7.19  127.80  107.50  235.30  0.8 
Yes       14.44  6.06       20.50  417.81  514.31  932.12  2.8 
MARITAL 
STATUS 
Other  6.30  4.16       10.46  207.25  185.22  392.47  1.6 
Married  6.90  3.99       10.89  198.77  243.62  442.39  0.9 
TAX 
KNOWLEDGE 
None  5.25  2.63  7.88  126.50  129.29  255.79  1.1 
At least moderate  6.75  4.28       11.04  214.12  224.82  438.95  1.3 
TAXABLE  
INCOME 
€ 0 – 20,000  3.80  2.23  6.02   60.43  143.14  203.57  2.7 
€ 20,001 – 40,000  6.83  4.39  11.22  177.93  169.65  347.59  1.2 
€ 40,001 – 60,000  4.63  2.77  7.40  137.82  142.79  280.61  0.6 
€ 60,001 – 80,000  11.22  6.80  18.01  476.37  424.20  900.57  1.4 
> € 80,000  6.75  4.03  10.78  288.29  402.34  690.63  0.6 
AGE 
≤ 25 years  3.17  1.34  4.52   57.88   82.50  140.38  1.6 
26 – 35 years  7.78  3.12       10.90  191.01  155.42  346.43  1.2 
36 – 45 years  4.21  4.08  8.29  159.06  181.77  340.83  1.1 
46 – 55 years  7.17  5.29       12.46  248.06  298.40  546.46  1.4 
> 55 years  9.09  3.50       12.59  246.54  208.71  455.26  1.5 
EDUCATION 
University degree  8.38  5.25       13.63  332.39  332.00  664.39  1.3 
University-entrance 
qualification 
4.08  5.59  9.68  150.72  158.60  309.32  1.1 
Secondary school   5.69  2.86  8.56  146.58  198.69  345.27  1.5 
Lower secondary 
school  
7.37  3.55       10.93  176.51  136.46  312.97  1.1 
CHILDREN  
0  5.73  3.93  9.66  167.48  147.42  314.91  1.3 
1  4.32  4.37  8.69  202.51  222.00  424.51  1.1 
2 and more  12.29  4.13  16.42  320.48  424.56  745.04  1.5 32 
Table 4: Regression results 
Model  1  2  3  4  5  6 
R
2   0.271  0.515  0.271  0.301  0.150  0.461 
Cases  456  456  458  458  308  308 
Constant  -3.446***  -2.420***  -5.479*** -5.534*** 0.515  -1.084 
  (1.324)  (1.039)  (1.180)  (1.172)  (1.748)  (1.491) 
TAXABLE INCOME  0.647***  0.627***  0.857*** 0.840*** 0.214  0.351***
  (0.108)  (0.087)  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.144)  (0.119) 
AGE  0.349  0.299  0.148  0.190  0.429  0.099 
  (0.236)  (0.190)  (0.242)  (0.238)  (0.331)  (0.258) 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT  0.936***  0.603***  0.527*** 0.700*** 1.091*** 0.569***
  (0.145)  (0.120)  (0.151)  (0.149)  (0.194)  (0.166) 
JOINT ASSESSMENT  -0.065  -0.266**  -0.400*** -0.331** 0.055  -0.160 
  (0.138)  (0.114)  (0.141)  (0.141)  (0.188)  (0.147) 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE  0.186  0.273**  0.290** 0.255*  -0.232  -0.156 
  (0.133)  (0.112)  (0.140)  (0.138)  (0.215)  (0.172) 
WOMAN  -0.057  -0.182*  -0.386*** -0.323*** 0.022  -0.133 
  (0.115)  (0.096)  (0.117)  (0.116)  (0.165)  (0.135) 
CHILDREN  0.114  0.061  -0.044  -0.021  0.097  0.009 
  (0.129)  (0.102)  (0.126)  (0.126)  (0.182)  (0.140) 
TAX KNOWLEDGE  -  0.350**  -  0.234  -  0.460***
  -  (0.144)  -  (0.172)  -  (0.156) 
ADVICE  -  0.362***  -  -0.468*** -  1.934***
  -  (0.023)  -  (0.118)  -  (0.149) 
Dependent variable: logarithm of compliance costs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** / ** / * indicate statis-
tical significance on the 1% / 5% / 10% level. Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized 
time burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
Table 5: Compliance costs per taxable income 
Survey group  Self-Employment  Other employment 
Taxable income  Net income  Gross income  Cases  Net income  Gross income  Cases 
€ 0 – 22,000  2.96 %  3.38 %  32  1.14 %  1.33 %  53 
€ 22,001 – 42,000  2.60 %  3.15 %  28  0.46 %  0.60 %  156 
€ 42,001 – 62,000  1.80 %  2.21 %  28  0.42 %  0.52 %  77 
> € 62,000  1.04 %  1.19 %  29  0.40 %  0.51 %  54 
Table 6: International estimates (mean values) 
Study  Country  Tax year  Time burden  Costs per tax revenue 
Slemrod and Sorum (1984)  USA  1982  21.7  5.0-7.0 % 
Sandford et al. (1989)  UK  1983-84  3.6  3.6 % 
Vaillancourt (1989)  Canada  1986  5.5  2.5 % 
Pope and Fayle (1990)  Australia  1986-87  10.7  7.9-10.8 % 
Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992)  USA  1989  27.4  -- 
Allers (1994)  Netherlands  1990  4.5  1.4-32.0 % 
Diaz and Delgado (1995)  Spain  1990  6.8  3.3 % 
Malmer (1995)  Sweden  1993  2.5  1.7 % 
Slemrod (1996)  USA  1995  --  8.5 % 
Tran-Nam et al. (2000)  Australia  1994-95  --  4.0-5.6 % 
Delgado Lobo et al. (2001)  Spain  1998  3.6  1.8 % 
Delgado Lobo et al. (2001)  Spain  1999  2.2  1.2 % 33 
Guyton et al. (2003)  USA  2000  25.5  8.3 % 
Blažić (2004)  Croatia  2001  1.7  0.9 % 
Klun (2004)  Slovenia  2000  1.7  2.5 % 
Blaufus et al. (2011)  Germany  2007  5.7  3.2-3.7 % 
Estimates on the individual income tax revenue in the U.S. refer partially to Council of Economic Advisers (2001). 
Table 7: Variance inflations factors 
Model  1  2  3  4  5  6 
TAXABLE INCOME  1.58  1.59  1.59  1.60  1.62  1.65 
AGE  1.13  1.13  1.13  1.14  1.09  1.10 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT  1.08  1.13  1.07  1.18  1.07  1.16 
JOINT ASSESSMENT  1.44  1.46  1.45  1.47  1.50  1.52 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE  1.12  1.13  1.12  1.12  1.11  1.12 
WOMAN  1.03  1.04  1.04  1.05  1.04  1.05 
CHILDREN  1.12  1.12  1.11  1.12  1.13  1.13 
TAX KNOWLEDGE  -  1.04  -  1.04  -  1.03 
ADVICE  -  1.11  -  1.18  -  1.14 
Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized 
time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
Table 8: Normality of the residuals 
Model  1 2  3 4 5 6
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z  0.623 1.162  1.052 0.925 1.149 0.631
Significance level  0.833 0.134  0.219 0.359 0.143 0.820
Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized     
time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
Table 9: Heckman selection results 
Model  1 2  3 4 5 6
Inverse Mills ratio  3.065 3.063  1.919 2.682 5.123 4.713
Standard deviation  2.635 2.420  1.606 2.060 6.899 6.301
Significance level  0.245 0.205  0.232 0.193 0.458 0.455
All models are based on 995 observations. Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time 
burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
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Table 10: Regression results: Linearity 
Model  1  2  3  4  5  6 
R
2  0.275  0.524  0.270  0.303  0.157  0.462 
Cases  456  456  458  458  308  308 
Constant  4.671***  4.507***  3.946*** 3.774*** 4.139*** 2.935***
  (0.187)  (0.241)  (0.192)  (0.262)  (0.270)  (0.243) 
TAXABLE INCOME             
             
€ 0 – 20,000  -0.968***  -0.857***  -1.300*** -1.254*** -0.216  -0.461*
  (0.242)  (0.193)  (0.222)  (0.222)  (0.314)  (0.248) 
€ 20,001 – 40,000  -0.288*  -0.142  -0.168  -0.143  0.113  -0.091 
  (0.150)  (0.125)  (0.165)  (0.161)  (0.212)  (0.158) 
€ 60,001 – 80,000  0.540***  0.576***  0.629*** 0.694*** 0.309  0.326*
  (0.169)  (0.143)  (0.212)  (0.206)  (0.244)  (0.188) 
 > € 80,000  0.514**  0.549***  0.690** 0.632** -0.049  0.175 
  (0.243)  (0.212)  (0.294)  (0.284)  (0.419)  (0.332) 
AGE             
             
≤ 25 years  -0.309  -0.272  0.110  0.139  -0.146  -0.208 
  (0.369)  (0.251)  (0.261)  (0.268)  (0.435)  (0.428) 
25 – 35 years  -0.082  -0.086  -0.044  -0.025  -0.069  -0.048 
  (0.166)  (0.137)  (0.165)  (0.164)  (0.239)  (0.179) 
45 – 55 years  0.091  0.130  0.213  0.217  0.164  0.054 
  (0.144)  (0.122)  (0.150)  (0.145)  (0.205)  (0.166) 
> 55 years  0.242  0.159  0.218  0.287  0.335  0.020 
  (0.179)  (0.154)  (0.191)  (0.189)  (0.247)  (0.183) 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT  0.865***  0.551***  0.471*** 0.641*** 1.039*** 0.518***
  (0.151)  (0.121)  (0.153)  (0.152)  (0.200)  (0.170) 
JOINT ASSESSMENT  -0.017  -0.190*  -0.266*  -0.187  0.161  -0.104 
  (0.137)  (0.115)  (0.149)  (0.147)  (0.191)  (0.149) 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE  0.189  0.257**  0.325** 0.290** -0.182  -0.132 
  (0.133)  (0.114)  (0.146)  (0.142)  (0.218)  (0.171) 
WOMAN  -0.084  -0.229**  -0.416*** -0.347*** -0.012  -0.165 
  (0.115)  (0.097)  (0.115)  (0.115)  (0.170)  (0.138) 
CHILDREN (DUMMY)  0.187  0.112  0.021  0.051  0.189  0.075 
  (0.122)  (0.102)  (0.127)  (0.123)  (0.188)  (0.142) 
TAX KNOWLEDGE  -  0.410***  -  0.293*  -  0.485***
  -  (0.150)  -  (0.175)  -  (0.161) 
ADVICE  -  -  -  -0.489*** -  1.926***
  -  -  -  (0.120)  -  (0.154) 
OUTSOURCING             
             
No Outsourcing  -  -1.018***  -  -  -  - 
  -  (0.165)  -  -  -  - 
0.1 – 20.0 %  -  0.058  -  -  -  - 
  -  (0.215)  -  -  -  - 
40.1 – 60.0 %  -  0.467**  -  -  -  - 
  -  (0.212)  -  -  -  - 
60.1 – 80.0 %  -  0.415**  -  -  -  - 
  -  (0.202)  -  -  -  - 
80.1 – 100.0 %  -  0.691***  -  -  -  - 
  -  (0.178)  -  -  -  - 
Dependent variable: logarithm of compliance costs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** / ** / * indicate statis-
tical significance on the 1% / 5% / 10% level. Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized 35 
time burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
Table 11: Variance inflation factors: Linearity 
Model  1  2  3  4  5  6 
TAXABLE INCOME             
€ 0 – 20,000  1.91  1.98  1.91  1.92  1.86  1.90 
€ 20,001 – 40,000  2.13  2.18  2.13  2.14  2.06  2.09 
€ 60,001 – 80,000  1.57  1.60  1.58  1.60  1.64  1.66 
> € 80,000  1.32  1.36  1.33  1.34  1.40  1.40 
AGE             
≤ 25 years  1.20  1.23  1.20  1.20  1.17  1.18 
25 – 35 years  1.45  1.46  1.45  1.45  1.46  1.46 
45 – 55 years  1.42  1.43  1.42  1.42  1.48  1.48 
> 55 years  1.38  1.40  1.38  1.39  1.44  1.46 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT  1.13  1.20  1.13  1.24  1.12  1.22 
JOINT ASSESSMENT  1.51  1.54  1.51  1.54  1.56  1.59 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE  1.18  1.21  1.18  1.19  1.19  1.19 
WOMAN  1.05  1.08  1.05  1.07  1.05  1.06 
CHILDREN (DUMMY)  1.19  1.20  1.19  1.19  1.28  1.28 
TAX KNOWLEDGE  -  1.07  -  1.05  -  1.05 
ADVICE  -  -  -  1.19  -  1.16 
OUTSOURCING             
No Outsourcing  -  3.51  -  -  -  - 
0.1 – 20.0 %  -  1.95  -  -  -  - 
40.1 – 60.0 %  -  2.17  -  -  -  - 
60.1 – 80.0 %  -  2.14  -  -  -  - 
80.1 – 100.0 %  -  3.36  -  -  -  - 
Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized 
time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
Table 12: Normality of the residuals: Linearity 
Model  1 2  3 4 5 6
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z  0.631 1.180  0.931 0.774 0.972 0.616
Significance level  0.820 0.123  0.351 0.586 0.301 0.843
Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized 
time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
Table 13: Heckman selection results: Linearity 
Model  1 2  3 4 5 6
Inverse Mills ratio  1.108 2.129  0.265 0.985 -0.147 0.080
Standard deviation  2.105 2.086  2.074 1.688 3.708 2.791
Significance level  0.598 0.307  0.898 0.559 0.968 0.977
All models are based on 995 observations. Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time 
burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
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Table 14: Regression results: Weighting 
Model  1  2  3  4  5  6 
R
2   0.232  0.530  0.330  0.369  0.102  0.458 
Cases  456  456  456  456  301  301 
Constant  -2.302  -1.315  -5.053*** -4.867*** 3.366  1.473 
  (1.723)  (1.160)  (1.097)  (1.080)  (2.196)  (1.715) 
TAXABLE INCOME  0.559***  0.583***  0.833*** 0.818*** 0.189  0.343**
  (0.122)  (0.096)  (0.111)  (0.105)  (0.173)  (0.137) 
AGE  0.274  0.216  0.137  0.187  -0.304  -0.464 
  (0.326)  (0.236)  (0.263)  (0.254)  (0.474)  (0.364) 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT  0.913***  0.521***  0.430** 0.636*** 1.087*** 0.507**
  (0.203)  (0.159)  (0.171)  (0.177)  (0.256)  (0.198) 
JOINT ASSESSMENT  0.004  -0.158  -0.275** -0.214  0.206  0.020 
  (0.195)  (0.143)  (0.130)  (0.137)  (0.243)  (0.192) 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE  0.217  0.275**  0.200  0.196  -0.316  -0.243 
  (0.206)  (0.139)  (0.126)  (0.125)  (0.301)  (0.227) 
WOMAN  -0.228  -0.295**  -0.443*** -0.386*** -0.121  -0.332*
  (0.161)  (0.127)  (0.143)  (0.135)  (0.210)  (0.170) 
CHILDREN  0.072  -0.052  -0.273*  -0.218  0.206  0.007 
  (0.193)  (0.133)  (0.153)  (0.154)  (0.223)  (0.158) 
TAX KNOWLEDGE  -  0.061  -  -0.106  -  0.113 
  -  (0.201)  -  (0.208)  -  (0.251) 
ADVICE  -  0.382***  -  -0.602*** -  1.907***
  -  (0.029)  -  (0.138)  -  (0.199) 
Dependent variable: logarithm of compliance costs. Standard errors are in parentheses; *** / ** / * indicate statistical 
significance on the 1% / 5% / 10% level. Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time 
burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
Table 15: Variance inflation factors: Weighting 
Model  1  2  3  4  5  6 
TAXABLE INCOME  1.67  1.72  1.67  1.73  1.84  1.93 
AGE  1.16  1.16  1.16  1.17  1.11  1.11 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT  1.05  1.07  1.05  1.10  1.04  1.10 
JOINT ASSESSMENT  1.45  1.46  1.45  1.46  1.64  1.65 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE  1.13  1.14  1.13  1.14  1.16  1.16 
WOMAN  1.05  1.06  1.05  1.07  1.08  1.09 
CHILDREN  1.10  1.11  1.10  1.11  1.10  1.11 
TAX KNOWLEDGE  -  1.07  -  1.06  -  1.07 
ADVICE  -  1.07  -  1.10  -  1.10 
Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized 
time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
Table 16: Normality of the residuals: Weighting 
Model  1 2  3 4 5 6
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z  0.713 1.022  1.032 1.116 0.840 0.589
Significance level  0.689 0.247  0.237 0.166 0.480 0.879
Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized 
time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 37 
Table 17: Regression results: Time valuation 
Model  1  2  3  4  5  6 
R
2   0.286  0.455  0.265  0.295  0.150  0.461 
Cases  456  456  458  458  308  308 
Constant  -3.127**  -2.354**  -4.870*** -4.926*** 0.515  -1.084 
  (1.230)  (1.037)  (1.178)  (1.170)  (1.748)  (1.491) 
TAXABLE INCOME  0.660***  0.650***  0.845*** 0.828*** 0.214  0.351***
  (0.101)  (0.087)  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.144)  (0.119) 
AGE  0.316  0.264  0.139  0.181  0.429  0.099 
  (0.220)  (0.191)  (0.242)  (0.238)  (0.331)  (0.258) 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT  0.852***  0.592***  0.515*** 0.689*** 1.091*** 0.569***
  (0.138)  (0.120)  (0.151)  (0.149)  (0.194)  (0.166) 
JOINT ASSESSMENT  -0.117  -0.278**  -0.392*** -0.323** 0.055  -0.160 
  (0.130)  (0.114)  (0.141)  (0.141)  (0.188)  (0.147) 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE  0.214*  0.287**  0.281** 0.246*  -0.232  -0.156 
  (0.124)  (0.112)  (0.140)  (0.137)  (0.215)  (0.172) 
WOMAN  -0.092  -0.193**  -0.380*** -0.317*** 0.022  -0.133 
  (0.107)  (0.096)  (0.116)  (0.116)  (0.165)  (0.135) 
CHILDREN  0.096  0.051  -0.046  -0.022  0.097  0.009 
  (0.120)  (0.102)  (0.126)  (0.126)  (0.182)  (0.140) 
TAX KNOWLEDGE  -  0.349**  -  0.235  -  0.460***
  -  (0.144)  -  (0.171)  -  (0.156) 
ADVICE  -  0.290***  -  -0.470*** -  1.934***
  -  (0.024)  -  (0.118)  -  (0.149) 
Dependent variable: logarithm of compliance costs. Standard errors are in parentheses; *** / ** / * indicate statistical 
significance on the 1% / 5% / 10% level. Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time 
burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
Table 18: Variance inflation factors: Time valuation 
Model  1  2  3  4  5  6 
TAXABLE INCOME  1.58  1.59  1.59  1.60  1.62  1.65 
AGE  1.13  1.13  1.13  1.14  1.09  1.10 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT  1.08  1.13  1.07  1.18  1.07  1.16 
JOINT ASSESSMENT  1.44  1.46  1.45  1.47  1.50  1.52 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE  1.12  1.13  1.12  1.12  1.11  1.12 
WOMAN  1.03  1.05  1.04  1.05  1.04  1.05 
CHILDREN  1.12  1.12  1.11  1.12  1.13  1.13 
TAX KNOWLEDGE  -  1.04  -  1.04  -  1.03 
ADVICE  -  1.11  -  1.18  -  1.14 
Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized 
time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
Table 19: Normality of the residuals: Time valuation 
Model  1 2  3 4 5 6
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z  0.808 1.299  1.015 1.052 1.149 0.631
Significance level  0.531 0.068  0.254 0.219 0.143 0.820
Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized 
time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 38 
Table 20: Heckman selection results: Time valuation 
Model  1 2  3 4 5 6
Inverse Mills ratio  2.794 2.847  1.772 2.561 5.123 4.713
Standard deviation  2.402 2.249  1.552 1.967 6.899 6.301
Significance level  0.245 0.206  0.254 0.193 0.458 0.455
All models are based on 995 observations. Models 1, 2: analysis of the sum of monetary expenses and monetized time 
burden; Models 3, 4: analysis of monetized time burden; Models 5, 6: analysis of monetary expenses. 
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